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LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR CORPORATE CRIMES
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a trend toward expanding personal accounta-
bility for acting or failing to act while serving in a position of
authority has emerged.' In the past few years, public debate
has focused on serious questions of personal accountability
in such matters as Watergate,2 the My Lai Massacre and
covert CIA actions abroad.3 In light of this trend, commen-
tators have called for increased criminal accountability of in-
dividuals for corporate wrongdoing.' A new zeal has
emerged for penetrating the multiple layers of hierarchy to
hold not only the corporation,5 but also high level corporate
6managers, responsible for crimes committed on behalf of
the corporation.
This comment will examine the recent trend toward im-
posing greater individual accountability for corporate
crimes. It will examine the case law in the area, as well as
the traditional requirements of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. The first sections will define the scope and limita-
tions of recent decisions. The last section will propose
solutions to better serve the goal of deterrence.
II. THE SCOPE OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
OF CORPORATE MANAGERS FOR
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
A. General Rule: Proof of Specjlc Intent
An individual may not escape criminal liability merely
by claiming that he acted on behalf of a corporation. 7 It is
1. McAdams & Tower, Personal Accountability in the Corporate Sector, 16 AM.
Bus. L.J. 67, 68 (1978).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 67.
5. See infra notes 186-217.
6. See infra notes 86-127.
7. It is clear that it is no defense to assert that the employee or agent was com-
manded to do the act by a superior. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395
A (1958) (an agent cannot escape criminal liability simply because he acted for a
principal).
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well established that the corporate veil is useless to protect a
corporate officer or director from the consequences of a
criminal act performed in his official capacity for the benefit
of the corporation. 8 Similarly, any superior who commands
8. See, e.g., State v. Pilch, 35 Conn. Supp. 536, 394 A.2d 1364 (1977) (corporate
officer who issued a worthless check may be held criminally liable under a statute
imposing criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another draws or
issues a check to any bank with knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds in
such a bank to meet the check); People v. Floom, 52 IM. App. 3d 971, 368 N.E.2d 410
(1977) (officers and directors may be criminally liable for their actions on behalf of
the corporation); People v. Cheff, 37 Mich. App. 1, 194 N.W.2d 401 (1971) (no de-
fense that an agent's action was in accord with the general policy of the company);
People v. Johnson, 28 Mich. App. 10, 183 N.W.2d 813 (1970) (defendant having ob-
tained money under false pretenses was liable for his actions regardless of the fact
that the act was performed in his official capacity); State v. Lux, 235 Minn. 181, 50
N.W.2d 290 (1951) (defendant, as president, treasurer and general manager of the
corporation, apparently knew that a criminal act was being committed; therefore
there was sufficient proof to impose criminal liability); People v. Klinger, 164 Misc.
530, 300 N.Y.S. 408 (1937) (existence of corporate entity did not preclude individual
liability of defendant, director and secretary of corporation who was charged with the
failure to return security deposited under a lease with the corporation, as long as
defendant's personal knowledge, participation, or other element of his personal re-
sponsibility was established); People v. Cooper, 200 A.D. 413, 193 N.Y.S. 16 (1922)
(defendant, who was treasurer and man in charge of incorporated laundry business,
could not escape responsibility for crime of creating a public nuisance by pleading
agency); State v. Olson, 83 S.D. 493, 161 N.W.2d 858 (1968) (defendant liable for
embezzlement because of bad checks issued by the corporation); State v. Cooley, 141
Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918) (president of corporation charged with fraudulently
obtaining goods and credit by means of check drawn by him in his official or repre-
sentative capacity); State v. Thomas, 123 Wash. 299, 212 P. 253 (1923) (defendant
convicted of larceny for misappropriating money paid into the corporation since he
directly participated in the transactions even though the money was paid into the
corporation through an employee who acted under the general direction of the de-
fendant); State v. Lunz, 86 Wis. 2d 695, 273 N.W.2d 767 (1979) (defendant, secretary-
treasurer of two corporations, convicted of conveying encumbered property with an
intent to defraud); State v. Laabs, 40 Wis. 2d 162, 161 N.W.2d 249 (1968) (secretary-
treasurer of corporation indicted for executing false financial statements for purpose
of obtaining renewal of dairy license); State v. Milbrath, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W. 252
(1909) (defendant, formerly a co-partner in firm engaged in loaning money, convicted
of embezzlement of money belonging to his clients through the corporate entity).
This common-law doctrine has been codified in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 502.060 (Bald-
win 1983); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (McKinney 1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 7.23 (Vernon 1974).
Several cases have interpreted these statutes. See, for example, Butts v. Common-
wealth, 581 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1979), in which undisputed evidence showed that the
corporation intentionally dealt with its customer's property as if it were its own, there-
fore the corporate agent who executed illegal conversions was responsible by opera-
tion of statute. See also People v. Sobel, 87 A.D.2d 656, 448 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1982)
(defendant liable under the terms of § 20.25 of the penal law despite the fact that
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or authorizes a corporate crime is himself liable as a princi-
pal.9 When a corporation is merely an individual's alter ego,
courts have found it even more appropriate to hold the indi-
vidual liable. 10
Although it is clear that any superior who commands or
authorizes a crime is liable as a principal, some affirmative
participation in the decision-making process must be proven
in order to convict a corporate officer of a crime." For ex-
ample, participation may be proven by evidence that the cor-
porate manager authorized or consented to the employee's
act.' 2 In other cases, a supervising manager's mere encour-
agement of or acquiescence in criminal activity may be a
sufficient basis for establishing criminal liability. 13
Clear evidence of indirect participation in criminal activ-
ity is often not available because the act itself was committed
there was no evidence that the defendant, as opposed to his corporation, stood to gain
by his actions); People v. Sakow, 45 N.Y.2d 131, 379 N.E.2d 1157, 408 N.Y.S.2d 27
(1978) (defendant's argument that he could not be held criminally liable because title
to the buildings was not in his name but that of the corporation was rejected and the
court held him individually liable for failing to comply with the Fire Department
Violation Order).
9. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 64, at 506-11
(1972).
10. See, e.g., State v. Picheco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584, 203 A.2d 242 (1964) (defend-
ant, as president, treasurer, manager and majority shareholder, convicted of keeping
his shop open in violation of the Sunday Laws); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944) (defendant who completely controlled and domi-
nated the corporate nightclub convicted of involuntary manslaughter when a fire in
the nightclub resulted in the death of patrons due to the number and condition of
safety exits).
11. See generally Sayre, Criminal Responsibilityfor the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARV.
L. Ruv. 689 (1930).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434
(2d Cir. 1978) (owner knowingly authorized employees to sign false medicaid and
medicare claims); United States v. Berger, 456 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir.) (upholding convic-
tion of president and chief executive officer of corporation who instructed bookkeeper
to remove invoices of foreign subsidiary which enjoyed favorable tax position for
willful evasion of corporate income tax), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); United
States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.) (sales manager convicted of making fraudu-
lent sales of securities where he dominated and controlled the salesmen and in-
structed them to make misrepresentations), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968) ;
Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1956) (upholding conviction of bank
employee who instructed subordinates to make false entries in bank records).
13. See, e.g., Dukich v. United States, 296 F. 691 (9th Cir. 1924) (proprietor pres-




by a subordinate.14 This type of misconduct can be hidden
beneath multiple layers of corporate decision making. Com-
plex factual situations may cloud the question of whether the
person who actually committed the crime acted under the
direction of the accused corporate manager.
This evidentiary problem has been resolved in a number
of cases in which courts have been willing to infer actual
knowledge on the part of corporate officers or directors. For
example, in the landmark case of United States v. Laffal, 5
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia16 inferred
that the president and chief executive officer knew of the ille-
gal conduct of the corporation's business. The court found
that based on the defendant's intimate involvement in corpo-
rate affairs, there was probable cause to believe that the pres-
ident knew that the business of the corporation was
prostitution and that he "either procured it to be done, or
permitted it to be done, or did nothing to prevent it."'17
Similarly, in Raleigh v. United States,' the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed the conviction of
a defendant for operating a house of prostitution. 9 The
court emphasized that the defendant, who was president,
treasurer and director of the corporation which owned the
hotel, maintained an office there and visited frequently. The
court stated that "[t]hese facts, coupled with the undisguised
and recurrent use of [the defendant's] hotel by prostitutes
and their customers, provided sufficient proof that [he] knew
the nature of the activities conducted at the Raleigh
House. '20
In State ex re. Krof v. Gilbert2' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court inferred specific intent from the defendant's acquies-
cence in the conduct of corporate business affairs. In their
14. See, e.g., People v. Dalsis, 5 A.D.2d 28, 168 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1957) (insufficient
evidence that the president of the corporation directly or indirectly participated in
grand larceny by misappropriating property entrusted to the company).
15. 83 A.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
16. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was formerly referred to
as the Municipal Court of Appeals.
17. 83 A.2d at 872.
18. 351 A.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 514.
20. Id. at 512.
21. 213 Wis. 196, 251 N.W. 478 (1933).
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complaint, the plaintiffs in error had alleged that their pre-
trial detention was unlawful because there was insufficient
evidence of their participation in the corporation's criminal
acts to warrant a finding of probable cause.2 2 The court de-
nied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus by directors and
officers charged with fraudulent conversion, stating that ac-
quiescence in the wrongdoing was sufficient participation.23
Denying the petition, the supreme court stated that al-
though it may sometimes be difficult to prove the actual par-
ticipation of the individual corporate officers in the criminal
act,24 those taking an active part in the management of the
corporation's business cannot avoid personal liability for
acts done in the regular course of business with their acqui-
escence. 2  The court held that knowledge or authorization
of the criminal acts may be inferred from the officers' inte-
gral role in the operation of the business, evidence of reports
issued to board members at meetings regarding the criminal
activity and the failure of the directors to prevent such con-
version thereafter by changing the conduct of corporation
business.26
However, the court stopped short of suggesting that lia-
bility should be imposed on an officer who had no knowl-
edge and no opportunity to discover the criminal act.27 The
court emphasized that a corporate officer cannot be charged
with a crime solely by reason of his official supervisory pow-
ers. "He is only chargeable with such knowledge. . . to the
extent that he in fact knew of such [actions] ...because
they were made by him, or at his direction by others acting
under his supervision or control, or because they were
brought to his attention. '28
These cases constitute the most commonly noted author-
ity for the proposition that a corporate officer's knowledge of
a crime can be inferred from his involvement and acquies-
22. Id. at 199-201, 251 N.W. at 479-80.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 217, 251 N.W. at 485 (quoting Salmon v. Richardson, 30 Conn. 360,
373 (1862)).
25. 213 Wis. at 216-17, 251 N.W. at 485.
26. Id. at 223, 251 N.W. at 488.
27. Id. at 218, 251 N.W. at 486.
28. Id. at 219, 251 N.W. at 486.
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cence in corporate affairs.29 The reasoning underlying impo-
sition of criminal liability in the Laffal and Raleigh cases is
analogous to the reasoning used by many courts in imposing
criminal liability on the controlling officer of a closely-held
corporation. 0 Courts clearly refuse to allow an individual
who is intimately involved in corporate activities to hide be-
hind the corporate veil.31
The Gilbert case stands for the proposition that specific
intent may be inferred when a corporate officer acquiesces in
the performance of a crime within his realm of authority.32
The rationale behind this theory of liability is that a super-
vising manager who knows a crime is ongoing and tolerates
its commission actually encourages the employee to continue
through a "rule of anticipated reactions. 33 One commenta-
tor expressed the theory behind liability this way:
Outside the context of a corporation, the law has been re-
luctant to impose criminal liability for knowing of a crime
and failing to prevent it. But when a corporate official
knows that subordinates within his realm of authority are
engaged in illegal activity, his toleration of the conduct is
more than a failure to act. By not controlling his subordi-
nates, the official knowingly permits his authority to be
used in the commission of a crime.34
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that there are
limits on how broadly the net of potential liability is stretch-
ed by this line of cases. The requirement of proof of specific
intent as an essential element of the crime has not been re-
moved. 35 Absent proof of participation by the corporate of-
29. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28.
30. See supra text accompanying note 10.
31. For a discussion of personal accountability in the corporate sector, see 3A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1348-1359 (rev.
penn. ed. 1975 & Supp. 1983); Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 16-28 (1928); Comment, Toward a Rational Theory of CriminalLiabilityfor the Cor-
porate Executive, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 75 (1978).
32. See Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime,- Regulating Corporate Be-
havior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1266 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Developments in the Law].
33. Id. at 1267 (citing H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DE-
CISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 142-45 (3d ed.
1976)).
34. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1268.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28.
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ficer in the crime itself, it is difficult to impose criminal
liability for crimes requiring mens rea or a culpable state of
mind.36 As a general rule, a corporate officer will not be
held criminally liable for acts of the corporation performed
through other officers or agents not acting under his direc-
tion or with his permission.37
B. Exception to the General Rule. Strict Liability
Although moral culpability is usually necessary to im-
pose criminal liability, the United States Supreme Court has
imposed strict liability on corporate officer supervisors in
certain areas of regulation such as public health, safety or
welfare.3 8 As one commentator stated, "[p]ublic welfare leg-
islation utilizes criminal sanctions to regulate conduct that
poses an unacceptably high risk of danger to the public at
large." 39
36. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (general
policy against strict liability in corporate crimes enunciated).
37. See, e.g., Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3 (Alaska 1974) (president of corporation
that owned and operated a trailer court not criminally liable merely because he was
an officer or agent of the corporation); Harrington v. State, 17 Md. App. 157, 300 A.2d
405 (1973) (officer not criminally liable if he in no way participated with the corpora-
tion in the illegal act as principal, aider, abettor, or accessory); People v. Lavender, 48
N.Y.2d 334, 398 N.E.2d 530, 422 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1979) (corporate officer not criminally
liable for failure to perform a home improvement contract when he had no connec-
tion with it); People v. Seufert, 49 N.C. App. 524, 271 S.E.2d 756 (1980) (where the
crime charged involves guilty knowledge or criminal intent, as does embezzlement, it
is essential for criminal liability on the part of the officer or agent that he personally
did acts which constitute the offense or that acts were done with his authorization);
Cincinnati v. Duval, 22 Ohio App. 2d 208, 260 N.E.2d 127 (1970) (president of corpo-
ration that owns and operates a cafe not criminally liable on the charge that he un-
lawfully permitted loud music to be played in violation of a city ordinance where he
was not on the premises at the time of such violation and took no active part in its
occurrence); Blacketer v. State, 485 P.2d 1069 (Okla. Ct. App. 197 1) (officer not crimi-
nally liable for the acts of the corporation performed through other officers and
agents); State v. Flake, 83 S.D. 655, 165 N.W.2d 55 (1969) (officer of corporation not
liable for the acts of the corporation performed through other officers and agents who
misappropriated money, unless such acts are done by his authority or permission or
with his knowledge and acquiescence); Bourgeois v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 268, 227
S.E.2d 714 (1976) (insufficient evidence to establish that president of corporation had
any connection with the acceptance of duplicate payments received by the
corporation).
38. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1952).
39. Brickey, Criminal Liability ofCorporate Officersfor Strict Liability Offenses-
Another View, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1356 (1982).
[Vol. 67:604
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Strict liability offenses impose criminal liability even
without proof of personal participation or criminal intent.
Accordingly, public welfare offenses have been distinguished
from "true" or "intent" crimes which require proof of both.40
Traditionally, these offenses have carried modest penalty
provisions and have supplemented civil enforcement
legislation.4 1
Few regulatory statutes are actually based on strict liabil-
ity. Most public welfare statutes require proof of
knowledge 42 or willfulness 43 as an element of the crime. The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act44 (FFDCA) is an ex-
ception to this rule. It is one of the few federal statutes
which has been interpreted to impose strict liability for vio-
lations. For this reason, it has become the most frequently
used vehicle for exploring the potential liability of corporate
agents for crimes in which they had no direct role.
In United States v. Dotterweich45 the United States
Supreme Court first recognized the possibility of criminal
prosecution under the FFDCA without proof of intent or
participation in wrongful activity. In prosecuting the presi-
dent of the Buffalo Pharmacal Company, the government of-
fered no evidence that he had either directly participated in
the wrongdoing or had knowledge of its occurrence.46
Dotterweich, Buffalo Pharmacal Company's president
and general manager,47 was held personally liable for the
corporation's introduction of adulterated and misbranded
drugs into interstate commerce. The Court found that "[t]he
offense is committed. . . by all who do have such a respon-
sible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
40. McAdams & Tower, supra note 1, at 68.
41. Id. at 68-69. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REv. 55 (1933).
42. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(1)-(2) (1976); Clean Air Act of 1970, § 113(c)(I)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(l)-
(2) (Supp. III 1979).
43. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (a) (Supp. III
1979); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(l)-(2) (1976); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 17(c), 29
U.S.C. § 666(c) (1976).
44. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
45. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
46. Id. at 285-86 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
47. 320 U.S. at 278.
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statute outlaws, namely to put into the stream of interstate
commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs. '48 The Court
specifically held that the FFDCA "dispenses with the con-
ventional requirement of criminal conduct - awareness of
some wrongdoing. 49
In Dotterweich the Court unequivocally interpreted the
FFDCA as permitting the imposition of criminal liability
upon an otherwise innocent person who stands in a "respon-
sible relation to a public danger. ' 50 Despite this potentially
far-reaching pronouncement, Justice Frankfurter, who au-
thored the majority opinion, recognized the factual nature of
the determination of personal liability and deliberately de-
clined to define the necessary degree of personal involve-
ment needed to convict an officer or director.51 Therefore,
Dotterweich left unresolved the scope of the legal duty im-
posed on corporate officers.52
For instance, it is unclear whether the Court would have
imposed criminal liability if Dotterweich had not personally
supervised the day-to-day operation, or if he had presided
over a large, national corporation. 53 Within the confines of
the factual situation in Dotterweich, it is very difficult to dis-
tinguish this holding from the line of cases in which courts
have inferred knowledge on the part of corporate officers
from their intimate involvement in the corporate business
and their acquiescence in the criminal activity which oc-
curred. 54 It is no wonder that in the aftermath of Dot-
48. Id. at 284-85.
49. Id. at 281.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 285.
52. See id. See also Brickey, supra note 39, at 1348-49.
53. Brickey, supra note 39, at 1347.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 15-28. In its disposition of United States
v. Park, 499 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd. 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction of the defendant and
distinguished the case from Dotterweich. The court noted the difference in the factual
settings of the cases:
Mr. Dotterweich was President and General Manager of Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, Inc. The company was small, employing only twenty-six employ-
ees, all of whom worked on the upper floor of the building. Mr. Dotterweich
was responsible for "general overseeing" of Company operations; he was the
direct supervisor of all employees. The trial transcript establishes that Mr.
Dotterweich personally made every executive decision and had direct personal
[Vol. 67:604
CORPORATE LIMITED LIABILITY
terweich, prosecutions under the FFDCA focused heavily on
the small businessman who had a close relationship to busi-
ness operations.--
The focus changed with the increased awareness of the
sanitation problems in the food industry in the 1970's.56 In a
1975 opinion, United States v. Park,57 the United States
Supreme Court clarified the questions that it left unresolved
in Dotterweich. In Park, the Court upheld the conviction of
John R. Park, president of Acme Markets, Inc., for criminal
negligence under the FFDCA, for allowing unsanitary con-
ditions to exist in a food warehouse in Baltimore. Park, the
president of a national food chain with 874 outlets and
36,000 employees, had received two direct communications
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)58 regarding
the unsanitary conditions at the Baltimore plant.5 9 He was
supervisory responsibility over the physical acts which resulted in the interstate
shipment of misbranded and adulterated drugs. In the instant case Park is the
chief executive officer of Acme, a multistate corporate giant. It is clear that his
supervisory responsibility over most employees is indirect. There is no allega-
tion or proof that Park was responsible for the executive decision which re-
sulted in contamination of the food. The facts of Dotterweich established the
personal responsibility which we find lacking in the case before us.
Park, 499 F.2d at 841 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
55. See Brickey, supra note 39, at 1357 n.86. The author cites the following cases
to illustrate the proposition: United States v. A.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th
Cir. 1974) (upheld conviction of an officer of bakery supply warehouse who had per-
sonal responsibility for all operations), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 1007 (1975); United
States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (upheld the revocation of probation of
convicted owner, president, and sales manager of cookie company); Lelles v. United
States, 241 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.) (upheld conviction of part owner and secretary of dairy
products wholesale company who managed its affairs and dominated the company),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957); Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. United States, 209
F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1953) (upheld conviction of president of company who managed
plant although he was not physically present when the violation occurred); United
States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948) (upheld convictions of operators of dia-
betic clinic in light of the fact that the jury considered the work they performed, their
duties and responsibilities, and extent to which they each controlled business of cli-
ents); United States v. Diamond State Poultry Co., 125 F. Supp. 617 (D. Del. 1954)
(upheld convictions of two major officers who determined corporate policy and super-
vised the operations of company).
56. See Brickey, supra note 39, at 1359.
57. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 64 (1976). The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is
directed and authorized to make and enforce such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.
59. Park, 421 U.S. at 660-62.
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charged when a subsequent inspection revealed continued
rodent activity and food contamination. 60
Park's defense in the matter was that many aspects of
corporate operations were necessarily delegated to dependa-
ble subordinates and that in this instance regional supervi-
sors had been ordered to take corrective action. He argued
that these subordinates were responsible for the failure to
fulfill the duties delegated to them.6'
Nonetheless, the jury found Park guilty as charged. The
trial judge had instructed them that they could find the de-
fendant guilty if they found that Park's position in the corpo-
ration was one of "authority and responsibility in the
business of Acme Markets" and if they found that he had "a
responsible relation to the situation, even though he may not
have participated personally." 62 In reversing the trial court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit63
stated that this instruction was impermissible because it led
the jury to believe that they could convict Park merely be-
cause he was president of the corporation. 64
The United States Supreme Court reversed and rein-
stated Park's conviction maintaining that the jury instruction
was appropriate under the circumstances. The Court found
that Park could be held personally liable for duties necessar-
ily delegated in the course of business and emphasized that:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on re-
sponsible corporate agents are beyond question demand-
ing, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent
than the public has a right to expect of those who volunta-
rily assume positions of authority in business enterprises
whose services and products affect the health and well-be-
ing of the public that supports them.65
The Court found that Park failed to fulfill a duty im-
posed upon him on the basis of his managerial relationship
to subordinates.66 The Court held that under the FFDCA,
proof that a corporate officer had the responsibility to pre-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 663-64.
62. Id. at 665 n.9.
63. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
64. Park, 499 F.2d at 841-42.
65. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
66. Id. at 670-71.
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vent the violation, and that he failed to prevent it, was suffi-
cient to establish the causal link necessary to convict.67 The
Court stated that causation was shown not by wrongful con-
duct, but by responsibility in the corporation.6  The absence
of participation in or personal knowledge of the wrongdoing
is not a defense in such a prosecution.69 The Court also em-
phasized that it is unnecessary to prove that the corporate
officer had direct supervisory responsibility over those im-
mediately responsible for the prohibited act.70
The cases that followed the Park decision illustrate that,
at least in this area of federal regulation, a corporate officer
may not place unlimited reliance on subordinates to perform
delegated tasks. For example, in United States v. Starr7 ' the
defendant, an officer in charge of actual operations of the
plant, was held personally liable for violations arising from
mouse infestation of the plant despite the fact that he had
ordered the janitor to take care of the problem in the pres-
ence of the FDA inspector. A subsequent inspection by the
FDA revealed that the janitor had not taken care of the
infestation.
Although Starr argued that he was justified in delegating
to the janitor the duty to comply with the regulation, the
67. Id. at 671.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 677-78. In Park, the only affirmative defense recognized was impossi-
bility. This defense permits a defendant to avoid liability if he can show that he was
unable to prevent the wrongful conduct, despite the exercise of extraordinary care.
Id. at 673. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1263-64 (author notes
that a successful defense would require proof that the corporate executive identified
conditions which might lead to a violation, acted forcefully to remedy them or imple-
mented alternative ones if remedial remedies were unsuccessful). The defense of im-
possibility has never been satisfied. Id. at 1263. In United States v. Y. Hata & Co.,
535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976), a case involving a prosecu-
tion under the FFDCA for failing to keep a food storage area free from birds, the trial
court had denied the defendant's request for an instruction on the defense of impossi-
bility. The defendant claimed that parts necessary for the construction of the cage
which was to enclose the storage area to keep troublesome birds out had not arrived
and, therefore, the corporation had been unable to remedy the situation.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected their claims and agreed with
the trial court that a jury instruction to this effect was unwarranted. The court held
that an instruction on the defense of impossibility was inappropriate when the de-
fendants had failed in their duty to consider invoking other alternatives to remedy the
situation. 535 F.2d at 511.
70. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
71. 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
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court rejected that argument. The court concluded that Starr
could not simply delegate the responsibility to the janitor
since he had the ultimate responsibility for maintaining a
sanitary warehouse. Starr had responsibility to check the
janitor's progress toward correcting the condition.72
This sample of case law illustrates the apparently harsh
effect of imposing strict liability for violations of the
FFDCA.73 The cases unequivocally state that corporate of-
ficers may not delegate responsibility for important tasks
which relate to the public welfare. Repeated and uncor-
rected violations of the FFDCA may result in the imposition
of criminal liability on a chief executive officer as a result of
his inattentiveness to tasks delegated to others. Corporate
officers and agents are charged with an affirmative duty to
adequately supervise their subordinates.74
Strict liability under the FFDCA is an exception to the
general rule that a corporate officer will not be held crimi-
nally liable for acts performed by other officers or agents
who are not acting under his direction or with his permis-
sion.75 Convictions for violations of FDA regulations stand
in stark contrast to convictions for the commission of "in-
tent" crimes, where courts are only willing to infer specific
intent on the part of the officer when some affirmative partic-
ipation in the criminal act is shown. In light of the potential
cost to society of ignoring FDA provisions, the Court has
carved out a narrowly defined category of criminal viola-
tions where strict liability is imposed and an officer or agent
72. Id. at 514-16.
73. Although it is easy to imagine how the potential for expanded criminal liabil-
ity might wreak havoc on the smooth functioning of the business world, the practical
effect is much less extreme. The FDA's administrative enforcement policy amelio-
rates the apparent harshness of strict criminal liability under the Act. Although the
Act does not require that a warning be communicated to the potential defendant, "as
a general rule the FDA does not recommend criminal prosecution without first send-
ing the potential defendants a warning letter." Brickey, supra note 39, at 1375.
See also Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability Under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act - The Dotterweich Doctrine, 30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5
(1975). See also Brickey, supra note 39, at 1375; Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement,
31 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 324 (1976); Remington, Liability Without Fault Criminal
Statutes - Their Relation to Major Developments in Contemporary Economic and So-
cial Policy. The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 625.
74. See supra text and accompanying notes 45-72.
75. See supra text and accompanying notes 7-37.
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may be liable if he stands in a "responsible relationship" to
the danger.
The FFDCA is one of the few public welfare statutes
which has been interpreted to impose strict liability.76
Therefore, although commentators have pointed to language
in cases interpreting this statute as providing a theoretical
basis for the imposition of expanded criminal liability, at
least in the regulatory setting77 it is clear that the impact of
decisions in this area has been overemphasized. The imposi-
tion of strict criminal liability, even in the regulatory setting,
is still strongly disfavored by the United States Supreme
Court.
In the 1978 case United States v. United States Gypsum
Company,78 the Court articulated its general policy toward
strict criminal liability in the area of corporate crime. The
Court stated that proof of intentional wrongdoing was re-
quired before liability for price fixing under the Sherman
Act79 would be imposed. It emphasized that strict liability
should be the exception, not the rule, with regard to criminal
liability.80 The Court clearly mandated proof of moral cul-
pability for criminal violations if the use of such sanctions is
to "square with the generally accepted function of the crimi-
nal law."8'
In light of this addendum to the decision in United States
v. Park,8 2 it is impractical to assume that imposing strict lia-
bility under a specific public welfare statute will become the
76. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. But see Abrams, Criminal Liability
of Corporate Officers/or Strict Liability Offenses - A Comment on Dotterweich and
Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463 (1981) (liberal reading of United States v. Park would
support holding a corporate officer liable only when facts support a finding of a de-
parture from a standard of care); Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1264-65
(defense of impossibility actually imposes a standard of extraordinary care and re-
flects the Court's reluctance to impose strict liability upon criminal defendants).
77. See Brickey, supra note 39, at 1377; McAdams & Tower, supra note 1, at 75.
See also Note, Criminal Liability of Corporate Managers/or Deaths of Their Employ-
ees: People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 46 ALB. L. REV. 655, 671 (1982) (strict liability
standard results in relative ease of proving causation in public welfare offenses
generally).
78. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
80. See United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436-37.
81. Id. at 442.
82. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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theoretical basis for expanding criminal liability. In Park
the Court spelled out an exception to the rule requiring
proof of specific intent to impose criminal liability. The ex-
ception was specifically tailored to sanitation problems in
the food industry in the 1970's.8 3 The limits of the decision
were delineated in United States Gypsum Co., in which the
Court stated that even in the regulatory setting, strict liabil-
ity was the exception, not the rule.84 As a means to achieve
regulatory compliance, strict liability is reserved for the most
exigent problems. In view of this, it is extremely unlikely
that the Park decision will become the authority for impos-
ing criminal liability upon corporate officers for "intent"
crimes committed in their realm of authority.8 5
C. Recent Developments
It is clear that outside the regulatory setting "specific in-
tent crimes" restrict individual accountability in the corpo-
rate realm since courts are constrained by the intent
requirements prescribed by legislatures.86 As a general rule,
the intent standard prescribed to impose criminal liability on
an indirect actor is identical to that prescribed for direct ac-
tors, even though their actions in causing the crime are very
different.87 As previously noted, courts will infer the intent
necessary to convict an indirect actor if it can be established
that he knew or acquiesced in the commission of a crime.88
However, absent any participation in the commission of the
crime, courts generally refuse to impose criminal liability
upon a corporate manager based on his position and respon-
sibility within the corporation. Although public welfare
laws occasionally impose an affirmative duty upon corporate
officers or agents to adequately supervise subordinates, "in-
tent" crimes do not impose such a duty.
One aberrant decision supports the proposition that a
corporate manager may be held criminally liable for the
83. See supra text accompanying note 56.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
85. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), has never served as authority for
that proposition.
86. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1269-70.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 7-37 and accompanying text.
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commission of an "intent" crime because of a failure to ful-
fill an affirmative duty to supervise. In United States v. An-
dreadis89 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
the conviction of the president of a corporation for know-
ingly using the mail, radio and television in a scheme to in-
tentionally defraud customers. The conviction was upheld
on the basis of the corporate officer's acquiescence in crimi-
nal activity. The court held that the president's knowledge
of the falsity of the claims could be inferred from the fact
that he reviewed and approved the advertising. 90
In dicta, however, the court stated an alternative basis for
liability. The court emphasized that the president should
not have been able to insulate himself from liability by
claiming he was not told that the advertisements were
false.9' The court asserted that the president "had some af-
firmative duty to insure that the claims . . . made for...
his product. . . were true," and that, "[a] person. . . having
failed totally to discharge this responsibility in even the
slightest measure, should not be permitted to escape the con-
sequences of his inattention. 9 2
Commentators still cite Andreadis in support of the prop-
osition that a corporate officer may be subject to criminal
liability for failing to exercise an affirmative duty to super-
vise his subordinates.93 However, the strength of this au-
thority has been diminished by the failure of any courts to
impose criminal liability on an individual corporate defend-
ant for an omission of duty.9 4 Courts tend to decide that
although inclusion of the mental element of specific intent in
a criminal offense is a matter of legislative choice, 95 the im-
position of severe criminal sanctions in the absence of any
89. 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
90. Id. at 430.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. For one of the most recent assertions to this effect, see Note, supra note 77, at
666. Even though the decision in Andreadis involved an "intent" crime, it has also
been cited in support of the proposition that it anticipated the decision in United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See McAdams & Tower, supra note 1, at 73.
94. See generally Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 599 (1958) (not-
ing distinction between an omission and a criminal act).
95. See generally United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
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requisite mental element is incompatible with the basic re-
quirements of Anglo-American jurisprudence.96
Recent developments clearly indicate that courts are es-
pecially reluctant to expand individual criminal liability of
corporate officers for more serious offenses. For example, in
its decision in People v. Warner-Lambert Company, 97 the
New York Court of Appeals dismissed the indictments9"
against four corporate officials99 charged with second-degree
manslaughter0 ° and criminally negligent homicide' 01 in the
deaths of six workers after an explosion at the Freshen-Up
Gum factory. 0 2 The four indicted officials had participated
in a management decision to slowly phase out the explosive
dustlike lubricant magnesium stearate rather than to take
immediate action to remedy the dangerous situation. 103 The
officials made this decision even though they had been
warned that the large amounts of magnesium stearate
presented a substantial hazard of explosion.' 4
In holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict
the defendants, the court found that although the evidence
established that the defendants were aware of a broad undif-
96. See Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 988 (1932). See generally Was-
serstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv. 731 (1960).
97. 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1031 (1981).
98. The Supreme Court, Queens County, in an unreported decision, dismissed
the indictment on the ground that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish
the offense charged. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the
Supreme Court in 69 A.D.2d 265, 417 N.Y.S.2d 997 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 51
N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031
(1981).
99. The four corporate officials were the vice-president in charge of manufactur-
ig, the director of corporate safety and security, the plant manager and the plant
engineer. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 296, 414 N.E.2d at 661, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
160.
100. "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e
recklessly causes the death of another person .. " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (Mc-
Kinney 1975). "Recklessly" is defined in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(3) (McKinney
1975) as follows: "[A] person acts recklessly. . . when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk .... "
101. "A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal
negligence, he causes the death of another person." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (Mc-
Kinney 1975). Criminal negligence is defined in N.Y.PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney
1975) as follows: "[A] person acts with criminal negligence . . . when he fails to
perceive a substantial unjustifiable risk .... "
102. Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 299, 414 N.E.2d at 661,434 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
103. Id. at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 663, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
104. Id. at 301, 414 N.E.2d at 662-63, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 161-62.
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ferentiated risk of explosion, the evidence did not establish
the specific chain of events that triggered the explosion.105
The court stated that "the defendants' actions must be a suffi-
ciently direct cause of the ensuing death"'16 before criminal
liability could be imposed. In this case the defendants could
not have foreseen the cause of death because the specific
events which triggered the explosion had not been
ascertained.10 7
In determining what established the requisite intent ele-
ment, the court expanded on principles previously articu-
lated in People v. Kibbe.'08 In Kibbe the defendants were
convicted of murder when they abandoned their helplessly
intoxicated robbery victim on an unlit highway on a cold
winter night without shoes or eyeglasses. The man was
eventually struck and killed by a passing truck. 0 9 The de-
fendants appealed their conviction on the basis that the state
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their actions
caused the death of another person. 10 In affirming the con-
victions of the defendants in Kibbe, the New York Court of
Appeals found that sufficient causation is established if it
can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ants should have foreseen the ultimate harm that the victim
incurred, and that in this case that burden had been met."'
105. Id. at 304, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64. There were two theo-
ries of the cause of the explosion. One expert testified that the explosion was attributa-
ble to mechanical sparking. Another expert testified that the initial detonation was
triggered by liquid nitrogen becoming trapped on parts of the moving machines and
then reacting violently when subjected to the movements of the metal parts. Id. at
305, 414 N.E.2d at 665, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
106. Id. at 306, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. See also Note, supra note 77, at 676 (the author postulates that this
decision, because of its emphasis on the foreseeability of specific events, actually
makes intent requirements more strict and pushes liability down to the lowest level of
corporate decision makers).
108. 35 N.Y.2d 407, 321 N.E.2d 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974), affd sub nom.
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
109. 35 N.Y.2d at 409-11, 321 N.E.2d at 774-75, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 849-51.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 412-13, 321 N.E.2d at 776, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52. In its decision
upholding the decision of the court of appeals, the United States Supreme Court
noted that it was unclear if "ultimate harm" meant merely the victim's death or if it
referred to the specific cause of death. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977).
19841
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In Warner-Lambert, the court clarified the requirement
of causation as articulated in Kibbe.112 It stated that suffi-
cient causation is established only if the defendants could
have anticipated the "chain of particularized events which in
fact led to the victim's death."' 1 3 The court held that since
the cause of the explosion was undetermined, the prosecu-
tion had failed to meet its burden of production.
The decision in Warner-Lambert is indicative of the gen-
eral reluctance of courts to loosen intent and causation re-
quirements in order to expand individual criminal
accountability in the corporate sector. Because the courts
have failed to impose criminal liability for specific intent
crimes on the basis of an omission of duty, many commenta-
tors continue to urge the imposition of greater personal ac-
countability of corporate officers. 14  They persuasively
argue that liability should fall on those officers with the re-
sponsibility and power to prevent the illegal conduct.'15
This trend has recently manifested itself in pressure for a
legislative solution. Several commentators have called on
legislatures to enact an intermediate standard between
"strict liability" and "specific intent" for imposing criminal
liability on individual corporate officers. 1 6 The proposed
intermediate standard would expand individual accountabil-
ity for corporate crimes, but still require proof of some moral
blameworthiness as an element of the offense." 7
One proposed alternative is to hold a corporate officer
liable for a misdemeanor if there has been inadequate super-
vision, 1 8 under a standard of either "negligent" or "reck-
less" supervision." 9 Under a standard of liability based on
"negligent" supervision, a corporate supervisor would be
112. See Warner-Lambert, 51 N.Y.2d at 406, 414 N.E.2d at 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
165.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 77.
115. See Note, supra note 77, at 667.
116. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1270-75. See also Da-
vids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 524, 530 (1967) (propos-
ing that the law should impose a responsibility of supervision on corporate executives
so that they could be held liable for a misdemeanor for remaining ignorant of the
actions of subordinates).
117. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1270-75.
118. See id.
119. See generally Davids, supra note 116, at 530.
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"criminally liable whenever he knew or should have known
of a substantial risk that an illegal act was occurring or
would occur within his realm of authority."'120 Although this
standard eliminates any incentive to avoid knowledge of the
illegal actions of subordinates, it poses substantial problems
with regard to fair notice' 2 ' and over-deterrence. 22
A second alternative is to impose criminal liability under
a standard of "reckless" supervision.123 A corporate man-
ager would incur criminal liability if he recklessly permitted
a crime to occur in his realm of authority. 24 Liability would
be imposed if a corporate manager knew of facts creating a
substantial likelihood of illegal conduct and did not inquire
further, or if a corporate manager knew of a hazardous con-
dition and failed to take remedial action. In this sense the
standard of reckless supervision is not very different from
cases in which the defendant's knowledge is inferred from
his acquiescence in the illegal conduct. 25
The effectiveness of either approach is limited. The in-
termediate standard between strict liability and specific in-
tent affects lower level managers who are closer to the crime.
Those who set corporate policy will continue to be shielded
from criminal liability by the multiple levels of decision
making within the corporate structure. The net of potential
liability formed by loosening intent requirements traps only
those who should have known that an illegal act was occur-
ring in their realm of authority. It will not affect high corpo-
120. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1270-71.
121. Id. The author cites Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 423, 432 (1963) in
support of this proposition. Id. at 1271 n.148.
122. Under this theory of liability, corporate officers would have difficulty pro-
tecting themselves from criminal liability. The resulting over-deterrence might in-
hibit job performance and result in a decline in creativity and efficiency. See
Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 127 1. But see Note, Decisionmaking Mod-
els and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1127 (1976) (illustrating
the benefits of routine procedure in the delegation of authority).
123. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1272.
124. Under this standard recklessness involves a conscious disregard of a sub-
stantial risk. Id.
125. Id. at 1273. The author notes that this requires proof of actual knowledge
and in that respect is similar to inferring knowledge from acquiescence in criminal
activity, although less specific information in the hands of the corporate officer would
be necessary to convict. Id.
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rate officials who are completely unfamiliar with the
situation. The standard of liability is not broad enough to
hold top officers responsible when they are not directly
involved.
It is also questionable whether the intermediate standard
of liability will be an effective deterrent to those corporate
officers or agents who are likely to be affected by its imposi-
tion. The penalties imposed under such a standard are likely
to be minimal because the crime is only a misdemeanor.
Furthermore, if the intent requirements of "true" crimes are
loosened to accommodate the societal desire to punish re-
sponsible corporate officers, the moral stigma attached to
such crimes may also be relaxed. 26 Accordingly, this in-
creases the public's sympathy for convicted white collar
criminals. 27
In short, the trend toward increasing individual criminal
liability for corporate crimes is limited by the scope of recent
decisions, as well as the traditional requirements of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. The general rule still stands: A
corporate officer will not be criminally liable for acts of the
corporation performed through other officers or agents who
are not acting under his direction or with his permission. In
light of the lack of authority supporting the imposition of
criminal liability on high level corporate managers for ac-
tions committed within their realm of authority, perhaps the
goal of deterrence would be better served by strengthening
existing penalties and sanctions.
III. STRENGTHENING EXISTING SANCTIONS
A. Effectiveness of Existing Criminal and Civil Sanctions
Imposing criminal liability upon individual corporate of-
ficers has generally been an ineffective means of deterring
126. See Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering 4ctivi-
ties, 18 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39, 51-52 (1983) (author notes with regard to
public welfare offenses that the casual use of criminal sanctions to punish business
activity which is not culpable leads to "the dulling of the moral stigma normally at-
tached to a conviction .... ).
127. See id. Similarly, the analogy can be extended to proposals to make "negli-
gent" or "reckless" supervision a misdemeanor. If enacted these standards might also
tend to blur the distinction between criminal and civil liability and reduce the moral
stigma associated with the commission of corporate crimes.
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illegal corporate conduct. "The criminal label traditionally
attaches itself only to conduct that is judged particularly
worthy of the moral condemnation of the community."z12  In
a capitalistic system in which profit maximization is an ac-
cepted goal, much of the business practice which is labeled
criminal is perceived as "undeserving of condemnation, let
alone . . . harsh criminal sanctions."'' 2 9 As a result, use of
criminal sanctions to punish individuals for conduct which is
barely distinguishable from socially acceptable business
practice has been limited.130  Light penalties are generally
imposed upon individual corporate officers who engage in
criminal activity, especially if such illegal action was under-
taken for the benefit of the corporation.13 '
A recent survey of judicial attitudes indicates that many
judges believe that by the time of sentencing, a corporate
officer has been sufficiently punished as a result of his or her
loss of reputation and career. 32 Imprisonment is considered
too harsh a penalty for nonviolent white collar criminals. 133
By not imposing a prison sentence, or by imposing only a
nominal sentence, judges avoid removing the white collar of-
fender from his community. 34  Since convicted corporate
executives often have exemplary records, judges tend to view
128. Radin, supra note 126, at 50.
129. Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Schol-
arshop, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 511 (1980).
130. Radin, supra note 126, at 50. See also Kadish, Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,
435-40 (1963) (author discusses the reasons why invoking criminal sanctions to com-
bat corporate crime has had limited effect).
131. Comment, Occupational Disqualfication of Corporate Executives: An Innova-
tive Condition of Probation, 73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 613 (1982).
132. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AN!.
CRIM. L. REv. 479, 482-86 (1980) (suggesting that fear of criminal prosecution, even
in the absence of conviction, may effectively deter corporate executives from engaging
in illegal activity).
133. Id. at 486-87. This type of attitude indicates an inherent bias within the
system in favor of upper middle-class defendants. Judges believe that white-collar
criminals "are more sensitive to the impact of the prison environment than are non-
white-collar defendants." Id. at 486. Judges may express concern for the health and
safety of convicted corporate officers incarcerated in a hostile prison environment.
Id. at 486-87. A term of imprisonment for such a person may be a "more painful
sanction than it is for someone who grows up somewhere where people are always in
and out of prison." Id.
134. Id. at 488.
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the crime committed as "one negative characteristic amidst a
cluster of other positive characteristics."'135 Presentence re-
ports often reveal that a corporate defendant is married and
has children, that he is reported to be a good parent, that he
is active in his church and local charities, and that he is a
professional person with clients who are dependent on
him. 36 In this situation, "the judge wants to impose a deter-
rent sentence, but would like to do it without also punishing
the defendant's spouse and children who will lose their
source of emotional and financial support, his employees or
clients who will lose their employment or professional serv-
ice, and the general community that will lose an otherwise
exemplary citizen."' 1 37
The result is that corporate offenders are much less likely
to be incarcerated than other criminals. Therefore, if intent
requirements for "true" crimes are lowered to increase indi-
vidual accountability for corporate wrongdoing, greater de-
terrence will be achieved only through increased
prosecution. 38 As the culpability associated with illegal
conduct decreases, convictions will be harder to achieve and
the punishments imposed upon corporate officers at sentenc-
ing are likely to be minimal.
B. Occupational Disqualification as a
Sentencing Alternative
Since judges are reluctant to incarcerate white collar
criminals, various creative conditions of probation have de-
veloped. Community service sentences are frequently im-
posed in lieu of prison terms. 39 It is not unusual for a judge
to require corporate executives to donate time to community
charitable organizations. 14 Some judges have even gone so
far as to require professionals, such as dentists, physicians or
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. Alternatives include imposing a fine or requiring the defendant to make
restitution to the victim. Id. at 491-92, 496-98. The authors believe that judges gener-
ally do not consider fines to be an appropriate sanction to impose on a convicted
criminal. "[T]he frequency of fines in white-collar cases would overrepresent their
perceived importance as an effective criminal sanction . Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 492-95.
140. Id. at 493.
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attorneys, to provide free services for a certain period of time
as a condition of probation. 14' In this respect, the corporate
defendant is sentenced to something more than just proba-
tion and forced to make amends to the community for the
crime committed.142 The imposition of special conditions of
probation provides a suitable compromise for judges who
are "torn between leniency and severity."'' 43
A growing number of observers have asserted that crea-
tive conditions of probation should be utilized more fre-
quently. One of the most innovative sanctions proposed is
"occupational disqualification."' 44 This approach deters il-
legal conduct by imposing a penalty which jeopardizes the
wealth and prestige that the white collar criminal was at-
tempting to augment through his criminal act.' 45
It is intended to penalize an executive officer or manager of
a business organization who has been convicted of an of-
fense committed in furtherance of the interest of the organ-
ization. Disqualification, imposed as a condition of
probation for a limited period of time and under stated cir-
cumstances, would bar this person from postconviction ex-
ercise of managerial functions bearing a reasonably direct
relationship to the conduct constituting the offense. 146
The rationale behind this approach is that "[s]ociety may
justifiably protect itself by incapacitating those who have
demonstrated their readiness to succumb to illegality." 141
Under this approach, punishment bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the corporate criminal act since disqualification
bars the offender from pursing his chosen occupation. 48
Loss of earnings makes disqualification equivalent to a
fine. 149 However, since the price paid after conviction is a
temporary loss of wages, the penalty bears a closer relation-
141. Id.
142. Id. at 492-93.
143. Id. at 495.
144. See Comment, supra note 131, at 604.
145. Id. at 615.
146. Id. at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
147. Id. at 617.
148. Id. at 615.
149. Id.
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ship to the financial ability of the defendant than statutory
fines which are often too low to deter illegal behavior. 50
Disqualification also works to change lenient attitudes
toward criminal activity within the corporation. 151 Indemni-
fication of corporate officials for fines that are imposed in
sentencing will no longer be sufficient to compensate a man-
ager who is temporarily out of work.152 Few managers will
risk the consequences of illegal conduct when their own live-
lihood is at stake. The cost of illegal activity will outweigh
the benefit since the corporation will stand to lose, at least
temporarily, its most valuable asset: managerial talent accu-
mulated through years of careful recruiting.
150. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 132, at 497.
151. Comment, supra note 131, at 616.
152. Id. The author states:
A probation condition which disqualifies the executive from corporate office
will have the effect of making such legally gratuitous payments to a disquali-
fied executive more difficult to implement than with an executive on simple
probation who continues to perform his preconviction duties; a shareholder
could claim in a derivative suit that the indemnification payments are unwar-
ranted and, if successful, enjoin payments to the disqualified employee.
Id. Indemnification is usually permissible if the corporate officer acted in good faith
and had no reason to believe his conduct was unlawful. See, for example, Wis. STAT.
§ 180.05(1) (1981-82), which provides:
(1) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or
threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action,
suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative
(other than an action by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact
that he or she is or was a director, officer, employe or agent of the corporation,
or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer,
employe or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or
other enterprise, against expenses, including attorney fees, judgments, fines
and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by the per-
son in connection with such action, suit or proceeding if the person acted in
goodfaith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or
proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful.
The termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settle-
ment, conviction, or upon a plea of no contest or its equivalent shall not, of
itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a
manner which he or she resonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or pro-
ceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his or her conduct was unlawful.
(Emphasis added). See generaly Note, Indemnification of Corporate Directors: A Dis-
incentive to Corporate Accountability in Indiana, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 229 (1983) (by
employing a combination of statutory indemnification provisions and insurance poli-
cies, coupled with the protection afforded under the business judgment rule, corpora-
tions are often able to effectuate for their officers an impenetrable shield from
personal liability).
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Moreover, occupational disqualification imposed as a
special condition of probation will facilitate even-handed
sentencing of corporate offenders. There is a widespread
perception on the part of the public that corporate criminals
go unpunished. Since judges seem unwilling to incarcerate
corporate offenders, they have an obligation to use their
broad sentencing discretion to develop sentencing alterna-
tives that deter illegal activity within the corporate sector.
Ultimately the issue must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis. Generally, the exercise of judicial discretion in sen-
tencing will be upheld on appeal. 153 When reviewing chal-
lenges to the imposition of special conditions of probation,
the standard is whether the trial judge abused his discre-
tion.'54Appellate courts will generally focus on several fac-
tors in evaluating the validity of occupational
disqualification as a condition of probation:
(1) Is the prohibited occupational activity one in which
the defendant was engaged when he committed the
offense?
(2) Is the condition a reasonable, if not the best, way to
prevent similar offenses from reoccurring and therefore a
reasonable way to protect the public?
(3) Does the condition have a reasonable relationship
to the treatment of the accused by preventing his exposure
to temptation to resume illegality? 155
It seems clear that judges are free to develop new creative
conditions of probation.1 56 The only restraint on a judge's
153. See Comment, supra note 131, at 630-33.
154. Id. at 632-33.
155. Id. at 633. See also United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723 (Ist Cir.
1977) (no abuse of discretion in trial judge's conditioning probation of a police officer
on his resignation from the force). Cf. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1976) (probation condition which ordered appellant's resignation from the bar struck
down).
156. Occupational disqualification may also be imposed by statute. For instance,
disqualification has been extremely effective in prohibiting corrupt leadership from
participation in union affairs. Section 504(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 "forbids convicted felons from holding union office or
serving as a labor relations consultant during the five years following conviction for
enumerated felonies involving 'moral turpitude."' Comment, supra note 131, at 626.
Under this federal statute disqualification is mandatory and not restricted to crimes
committed in the course of union duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976).
This statute was originally passed because of concern over union corruption.
However, in view of the increasing prevalence of illegal corporate activity, there is no
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discretion is that he must be able to justify its exercise on
review.157 Therefore, given the flexibility in the sentencing
process, creative conditions of probation may increase indi-
vidual accountability for corporate crimes without necessi-
tating the revision of traditional theories of "criminal
intent."
C Fines Imposed as Civil or Criminal Sanctions
Many federal statutes authorize the imposition of civil
remedies and criminal sanctions for the same conduct. 58
The civil-criminal distinction is subtle in the area of corpo-
rate violations because a court may impose either a civil or
criminal fine. 159 Generally, criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions result only when there has been a flagrant and willful
disregard of the law on the part of corporate officials. 160
Although administrative agencies do not have the power
to prosecute criminal cases, they do have responsibility for
implementing civil enforcement and recommending criminal
prosecution. 6 1 Responsibility for this determination vests a
considerable amount of discretion in administrative offi-
cials.' 62  Although the decision to proceed criminally is
based on the seriousness of the violation, the determination
of seriousness is largely a subjective inquiry. 63
In this respect, the offending conduct is viewed on a con-
tinuum: (1) is the conduct serious enough to require the im-
longer any reason for the unequal treatment of union and corporate officials. It is
arguable that a similar legislative solution is necessary to restrain illegal corporate
activity. See Comment, supra note 131, at 626-28.
157. Comment, supra note 131, at 632-33. States such as Wisconsin may have a
more narrow view of the appropriate exercise of discretion in this area. See State v.
Dean, 102 Wis. 2d 300, 306 N.W.2d 286 (1981) (probation requirement that doctor
provide services to the poor for three years exceeded authority of judge). But see
State ex rel. Mulligan v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 86 Wis. 2d 517, 273
N.W.2d 290 (1979) (probation condition that individual no longer partake in alcohol
held valid); Ramaker v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 563, 243 N.W.2d 534 (1976) (probation
requirement that defendant not associate with children upheld).
158. See Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1300.
159. d. at 1301.
160. See Comment, supra note 131, at 613.
161. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1300 n.1. It is constitutional for
administrative agencies to impose civil penalties. d. at 1300 n.1 (citing Lloyd Sa-
baudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1932)).
162. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1307.
163. Id. at 1308.
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position of a sanction? and (2) if so, is the conduct serious
enough to proceed criminally? 64 Administrative agencies
will generally not recommend criminal prosecution unless
the corporate offender has been put on notice that his con-
duct violates the law. 165  If the decision is made to proceed
criminally then the administrative agency must forward the
case to the Justice Department. 166
In recent years, because of increased public awareness of
corporate crime, a debate has raged over what type of pun-
ishment will best deter illegal corporate behavior. Many
commentators have argued for increased criminal penalties,
including more frequent incarceration of white collar de-
fendants. However, given the hesitancy of courts to subject
nonviolent white collar criminals to the full force of the
criminal system, an effective system of civil penalties may
164. Id. at 1307.
165. See Comment, supra note 131, at 609 n.26, in which the author discusses
approaches taken by administrative agencies:
The Justice Department brings criminal antitrust charges only in cases in-
volving well-defined types of trade restraints. Baker & Reeves, The Paper La-
bel Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 623-24 (1977) ("[w]here complex
and novel issues of law are involved, or where there is clear evidence that the
defendants did not appreciate the consequences of their actions, the [Antitrust]
Division proceeds civilly."). See also Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict:
Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
405, 409 (1978) ("[m]ost criminal antitrust cases involve hard-core price-fixing
and market allocations in which the defendants have clear notice and the De-
partment has no responsible choice except to proceed by criminal indictment
In criminal prosecution of food adulteration, when individuals were crimi-
nally prosecuted, the firms under their control had a history of prior sanitation
problems and, in every case, some form of warning and follow-up inspection
preceded prosecution. See O'Keefe & Shapiro, Personal Criminal Liability
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act- The Dotterweich Doctrine,
30 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 5, 28-30 (1975).
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Justice Department, when
dealing with environmental abuse, bring criminal charges against corporate
officials only when the Government believes that "(1) They [corporate officials]
had actual knowledge that the corporation was violating a standard or order,
and (2) They failed to correct the violation or to prevent it from re-occuring."
Statement of James Moorman, former Assistant Attorney General, Land and
Natural Resources Division, Third Toxic Substances Control Conference
(Dec. 5, 1978), 10-11 quoted in White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 169, 369 n.1718 (1980).
166. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1307. At that point it becomes
the Justice Department prosecutor's decision to proceed. Id.
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ensure a higher level of deterrence than can be achieved
through criminal sanctions.
One commentator, Richard A. Posner,167 believes that
fines are the optimal penalty to deter corporate miscon-
duct. 68 Posner, a theorist in the study of economics in the
law states:
In a social cost-benefit analysis of the choice between
fining and imprisoning the white collar criminal, the cost
side of the analysis favors fining because . . . the cost of
collecting the fine from one who can pay it (an important
qualification) is lower than the cost of imprisonment. On
the benefit side, there is no difference in principle between
the sanctions. The fine for a white-collar crime can be set
at whatever level imposes the same disutility on the de-
fendant, and thus yield the same deterrence, as the prison
sentence that would have been imposed instead. Hence,
fining the affluent offender is preferable to imprisoning him
from society's standpoint because it is less costly and no
less efficacious. 16
9
Posner argues that because the term of imprisonment im-
posed for corporate crimes is short, a fine equivalent exists
for most prison sentences. 70  He states that as long as the
fine can be collected from the offender,17 ' the imposition of a
fine is a less expensive sanction for society to impose than
167. At the time Richard A. Posner wrote the article referred to in this comment,
he was a Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. He
has since been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
168. See generally Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1980).
169. Id. at 410.
170. See id.
171. Id.
It should be noted also that the affluent offender presents interesting opportu-
nities for society to exercise its ingenuity in the collection of fines. For exam-
ple, a penalty that takes the form of barring the defendant from pursuing his
occupation - a penalty frequently used by the SEC in dealing with securities
fraud and by state authorities in dealing with misconduct by lawyers - is the
equivalent of a fine. The amount of the 'fine' is simply the difference between
the defendant's future income in the occupation from which he is barred and
the income in his best alternative occupation, discounted to present value.
This device offers a means of collecting a large fine from an individual who
has a large earning capacity but little wealth. An alternative possibility is the




incarceration. 72 He posits, however, that the moral stigma
of criminal conviction is costly in itself and yields no reve-
nue for society. 173 Posner argues that in many instances de-
terrence can be effectively accomplished through civil
penalties enforced by private parties and administrative
agencies.1 4 In support of this proposition, he notes that in
civil antitrust suits there is the possibility of recovering treble
damages, an award that is typically higher than the maxi-
mum statutory fine imposed for a criminal antitrust viola-
tion. 7 5 Posner states that "a good deal of punishment is
meted out in civil penalty suits."'' 76
Conversely, Posner's traditional adversary, John Collins
Coffee, Jr.,177 asserts that the threat of incarceration is a
greater deterrent than the threat of a fine.'78 He states that
the legal threat of incarceration of an individual offender
will exceed any applicable range of monetary penalties and
that this greater threat cannot be offset by increasing the se-
verity of monetary penalties.179
Coffee argues that deterrence will be achieved only if the
"expected punishment cost"'' 10 of the illegal conduct exceeds
the "expected gain."'' He states:
This concept of the expected punishment cost involves
more than simply the amount of the penalty. Rather, the
expected penalty must be discounted by the likelihood of
apprehension and conviction in order to yield the expected
punishment cost. For example, if the expected gain were
$1 million and the risk of apprehension were 25%, the pen-
alty would have to be raised to $4 million in order to make
the expected punishment equal the expected gain ...
The crux of the dilemma arises from the fact that the maxi-
172. Id. at 410.




177. John Collins Coffee, Jr., is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University
Law Center.
178. Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Eco-
nomics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 419, 422-23 (1980).
179. Id. at 423.
180. Coffee, "'No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick' An Unscandalized Inquiry into




mum meaningful fine that can be levied against any corpo-
rate offender is necessarily bounded by its wealth. 82
Coffee believes that the greatest deterrent is achieved by
the threat of incarceration of the individual. He argues that
if a mere fine is imposed upon an individual for illegal cor-
porate action, the individual can escape the effect through
indemnification by the corporation. 83 Moreover, he states
that fines do not incapacitate the offender and prevent cor-
porate recidivism. 184 Finally, Coffee notes that fines discrim-
inate against the poor.1 85 For these reasons, Coffee does not
believe that fines, particularly civil penalties, are the answer
to corporate criminality.
This classic debate illustrates the need to develop a
mixed system of sanctions including incarceration. Since
corporate crime is viewed by judges as a breed apart from
other criminal conduct, there must be sentencing options to
deal with corporate misconduct, especially with regard to the
marginal cases that can be prosecuted either civilly or
criminally.
Therefore, it is imperative that the viability of the fine as
a civil or criminal penalty be restored. The use of fines to
achieve deterrence requires flexible penalties because corpo-
rate offenders vary in size and wealth. Maximum statutory
fines in criminal actions should be abolished and a discre-
tionary standard for setting the monetary fine should be sub-
stituted. Similarly, civil penalties should be flexible. The
administrative agencies should have the power to determine
the amount of fines in accordance with statutory guidelines.
D. Conviction of the Corporation
At common law a corporation could not be convicted of
182. Id. at 389-90.
183. Coffee, supra note 178, at 425.
184. Id.
185. Id. Posner acknowledges that there is discrimination in the imposition of
punishment. He states that since the disutility of imprisonment rises with income, a
uniform prison term discriminates against the rich. He posits that "if we want not to
discriminate against the rich through an imprisonment system, we can make the
length of the sentence inverse to the offender's income." Posner, supra note 168, at
415. We also can choose to discriminate against the rich further by progressively
increasing fines with the offender's wealth. Id. "In either case the choice to discrimi-
nate is independent of the form of the punishment." Id.
[Vol. 67:604
CORPO4TE LIMITED LIABILITY
a crime 18 6 because it was not capable of forming the criminal
intent' 87 required and had no body to imprison."8 " These
conceptual barriers to the criminal liability of corporations
have been reexamined in light of the increasing importance
of the corporation in the modem business world and the cor-
responding need to regulate corporate behavior.
In recent years there has been a movement away from
the common-law rule. Under the modem view, a corpora-
tion can be held criminally liable for conduct performed by
an agent on its behalf within the scope of his employment. 89
Courts are now willing to impute the necessary intent to
hold a corporate entity criminally liable. 90 Old statutory
prohibitions against the prosecution of a corporation when
incarceration is the only punishment authorized are disap-
pearing. 191 Typically, in order to facilitate the prosecution of
corporate entities for criminal activity, fines will be imposed
upon corporations as punishment for offenses which do not
otherwise give rise to such a penalty. 92
But even in light of judicial recognition of the validity of
prosecuting a corporation for a criminal act, the applicability
of particular statutory offenses to corporations is not certain.
Every statute must be analyzed separately. Courts generally
consider the nature of the crime and the legislative intent to
186. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, § 33 at 228.
187. But et. United States v. Mac Andrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (it is as logical to impute an evil mind to a corporation, as a
contractual obligation).
188. Older cases indicate that a corporation may not be charged with any crime
for which the only penalty prescribed is imprisonment. See, e.g., People v. Strong,
363 Ill. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936).
189. In support of the general proposition that a corporation is criminally liable
for the acts of its agents in the scope of their authority, see United States v. Wise, 370
U.S. 405 (1962); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa.
1964); State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 483 P.2d 687
(1971); State v. Dried Milk Prod. Coop., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962).
190. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909) (landmark case under which corporations may be held responsible and
charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority
conferred upon them).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 602 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904)
(landmark case in which the absence of appropriate statutory authorized punishment
did not bar liability since legislative intent was not to immunize corporations).
192. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, § 33, at 229-30.
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determine whether a corporation can be prosecuted pursuant
to the statute. 193
Homicide indictments against corporations have been
particularly problematic. 194 In one of the earliest cases, Peo-
ple v. Rochester Rail & Light Company,95 the New York
Court of Appeals held that although a corporation can com-
mit most crimes, the statutory definition of homicide, de-
fined as "the killing of one human being by the act,
procurement or omission of another,"'' 96 does not apply to a
corporation because the word "another" was intended to be
limited to human beings. 197
The New Jersey Supreme Court broke through this se-
mantical barrier in 1917 in State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad
Co. ,198 recognizing that homicide statutes need not be read
to preclude indictments against corporations. 199 This com-
mon sense approach was considered to be aberrational for
more than fifty years.
In 1974, however, in People v. Ebasco Services, Inc. 20 a
New York court interpreted the word "person" to include
corporate entities and subjected a corporation to liability for
homicide.20 ' Following this decision, at least two other state
courts have held that liability can be imposed on corpora-
tions under statutes defining homicide as the unlawful kill-
ing of one person by another.0 2
193. Id. at 230.
194. For a discussion of the theoretical implications of prosecuting a corporation
for homicide, see Comment, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide: The Contro-
versy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 465, 471-74 (1981); Comment, Corporate
Homicide: The Stark Realities of 4rtfcial Beings andLegal Fictions, 8 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 367, 394-409 (1981).
195. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
196. Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24. The word "person" is commonly defined in gen-
eral statutory definitions to include corporations. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 9, § 33, at 230.
197. 195 N.Y. at 107-08, 88 N.E. at 24.
198. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
199. Id. at 376, 103 A. at 686.
200. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974).
201. Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
202. See Note, Corporate Homicide. A New Assault on Corporate Decisionmak-
ing, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 922 (1979) (citing State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind.
Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978)); see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mclil-
wain School Bus Lines, 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980).
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The most notable of these two decisions is State v. Ford
Motor Company. 3 In the Ford Motor case, the corporation
was charged with reckless homicide for deaths caused by de-
fects in the Pinto model which were concealed from the con-
sumer by the corporation. The trial judge followed the
Ebasco reasoning and determined that the legislature in-
tended the term "person" to include corporations with re-
gard to the commission of a homicide. 204  The Ford
Corporation was, therefore, subjected to a homicide prosecu-
tion, notwithstanding the restrictive statutory language.
In addition to establishing a significant precedent which
provides a basis for interpreting homicide statutes, the Pinto
case presented a number of novel issues.20 5 The Ford prose-
cution was one of the first which involved not just a single
agent, but an act which was the product of a complex busi-
ness decision. °6 This approach highlights the greatest ad-
vantage of imposing criminal liability on a corporation:
prosecution of the corporate entity may be possible even
when the specific culpable agent or agents are impossible to
pinpoint. °7
Although it has been argued that the imposition of crimi-
nal liability on a corporation is a less effective means to com-
bat corporate crime than the imposition of liability on the
individual,2° in this type of situation it may be the only al-
ternative for the prosecutor. Moreover, even though it is ex-
tremely difficult to measure the deterrent value of a
203. No. 5324, slip. op. at 8 (Ind. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1978).
204. Id.
205. Note, supra note 202, at 922.
206. Id.
207. Note, supra note 77, at 674.
208. Many commentators believe that imposing criminal liability on a corporate
entity is undesirable. It has been asserted that any adverse impact achieved by impos-
ing criminal liability on a corporate entity tends to fall heavily on innocent parties.
See Note, supra note 202, at 922. It also tends to result in all corporate agents being
stigmatized by the criminal conduct. Note, supra note 77, at 675. It has been postu-
lated that it is unfair to shareholders, who are generally powerless to control the
course of corporate conduct and who stand to lose their investment. See Note, supra
note 202, at 921. But see Radin, supra note 126, at 52 (asserting that since shareholder
is not personally liable, loss is limited to the shareholder's capital investment). It has
been argued that the risk of loss may fall on even less blameworthy parties such as
creditors, employees and consumers. See Id. at 53.
Similarly, it is argued that the imposition of criminal liability on the corporate
entity does not accomplish this deterrent purpose since the imposition of nominal
fines generally has only a small financial impact on the corporation. Id.
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particular penalty, social and moral condemnation results
from imposing criminal liability on a corporation, particu-
larly for serious crimes.2 0 9 This condemnation might deter
potential investors,21 0 result in ruined product lines, 21' or
threaten future revenues.2 12  In this respect, corporations
might very well be deterred from cold, calculating risk-anal-
ysis213 in light of the potential business impact.
Furthermore, the government is not limited to choosing
between prosecuting the corporation and the individual cor-
porate agent.21 4  The government may prosecute both the
corporation and the individual at a joint trial.2 1 5 As a rule of
thumb, whenever possible, the prosecution should attempt to
indict the corporate entity and all individuals involved in the
decision-making process. This joinder will prod courts to in-
yoke many common criminal statutes and apply them to the
corporate entity.21 6 This approach also maximizes the deter-
209. See Note, supra note 202, at 923.
210. Note, supra note 77, at 674.
211. See Note, supra note 202, at 923.
212. Id.
213. See Radin, supra note 126, at 55 n.121. The author cites to a broadcast over
the CBS Television Network, 60 Minutes, "Is Your Car Safe?," June 11, 1978, which
stated that in marketing its Pinto, the Ford Motor Company anticipated 180 bum
deaths and 180 serious bum injuries. Ford calculated that each life was worth
$200,000, and each serious bum was worth $67,000, resulting in a total liability of
$48,060,000, while the cost of modifying the Pinto would have been $137 million.
214. See State v. Shouse, 177 So.2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (that corpora-
tion is being held liable for embezzlement does not render immune from prosecution
the agent who committed or authorized the corporate act); State v. Loucheim, 36 N.C.
App. 271, -, 244 S.E.2d 195, 203-04 (1978) (holding that "[w]here the agent of a
corporation in the course of his and his employer's business obtains anything of value
for the corporation by false pretenses both the corporation and the agent may be
convicted.").
215. Consistency of the verdicts against the corporation and the individual is not
required. See Magnolia Motor & Lodging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
216. For example, corporations are subject to criminal liability for offenses pun-
ishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. A corporation cannot be imprisoned and
therefore it is not subject to criminal liability where the only penalty is imprisonment.
53 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 132 (1964). But see State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau,
Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 483 P.2d 687 (1971) (under a statute which indicates the word
"person" as used in statutes includes corporations, as well as natural persons, a corpo-




rence value by punishing the corporation, as well as the indi-
viduals involved.217
IV. CONCLUSION
The trend toward increased personal criminal liability
for corporate actions is limited by the scope of recent deci-
sions as well as by the traditional requirements of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. Some commentators have seized
upon the sweeping language in the cases interpreting public
welfare statutes as providing the theoretical underpinnings
for expanding the criminal accountability of corporate of-
ficers.218 Yet despite sweeping language in cases such as
United States v. Park,2 19 the effect of these decisions is lim-
ited by the regulatory nature of public welfare offenses and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions220 which reinforce the
traditional view that strict liability in criminal law is re-
served only for exceptional regulatory offenses and is not to
be applied on a broad basis.22 '
Proof of specific intent and causation remain the basic
requirements for the imposition of liability in "true"
222crimes. These requirements make it all but impossible to
impose criminal liability on high-level corporate managers
who did not affirmatively participate in or know of the crim-
inal activity.22 3 Courts are especially unwilling to loosen in-
tent and causation requirements and impose criminal
liability for serious offenses when the conduct of the high-
level executive is not clearly culpable.224
However, in spite of this, commentators continue to urge
that individual liability be expanded because of the per-
ceived need to develop some effective deterrent to criminal
corporate conduct. Although far reaching solutions, such as
217. See, e.g., People v. American Medical Centers of Mich., Ltd., 118 Mich.
App. 135, 324 N.W.2d 782 (1982) (individual defendants sentenced to five years pro-
bation while all defendants, including the defendant corporation, were ordered to
make restitution for numerous counts of Medicaid fraud).
218. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
219. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
220. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 38-85.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 7-37.
223. However, a corporate superior who commands or authorizes a corporate
crime may be held criminally liable. See supra text accompanying note 11.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 86-127.
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loosening the intent requirement for "true" crimes, seem at-
tractive, there are more practical measures which can be in-
voked to refine the law in this area. The goal of deterrence is
better served by strengthening existing penalties and sanc-
tions. Alternatives in sentencing must be explored because
judges are less willing to incarcerate corporate officers than
other criminals. 25 Judicial experimentation with innovative
conditions of probation, such as occupational disqualifica-
tion, should be encouraged.226 The use of the fine as a viable
criminal or civil penalty must be restored. 227 And finally,
prosecutors should test the applicability of criminal statutes
to the corporate entity by indicting the corporation, as well
as the specific individual actors, whenever possible .2 2  This
approach will maximize the deterrence potential by punish-
ing both the principal and the agent responsible for the ille-
gal action.2 2 9 The corporation thus will be less able to hide
illegal activity within a complex or multi-layered decision-
making process.230  The net result of these incremental
changes will be increased pressure on the corporate deci-
sionmakers to eliminate illegal activity from corporate
policy.
TRACEY L. SPIEGELHOFF
225. See supra text accompanying notes 128-40.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 141-57.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 158-85.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 186-217.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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